Job search with bidder memories

  title={Job search with bidder memories},
  author={Carlos Carrillo-Tudela},
Job Search with Bidder Memories This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future… CONTINUE READING

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