Job Market Signaling

@article{Spence1973JobMS,
  title={Job Market Signaling},
  author={Michael Spence},
  journal={Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  year={1973},
  volume={87},
  pages={355-374}
}
  • M. Spence
  • Published 1 August 1973
  • Economics
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics
1. Introduction, 355. — 2. Hiring as investment under uncertainty, 356. — 3. Applicant signaling, 358. — 4. Informational feedback and the definition of equilibrium, 359. — 5. Properties of informational equilibria: an example, 361. — 6. The informational impact of indices, 368. — Conclusions, 374. 

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