Corpus ID: 73552593

Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size

@article{Kanbur1991JeuxSF,
  title={Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size},
  author={R. Kanbur and M. Keen},
  journal={The American Economic Review},
  year={1991},
  volume={83},
  pages={877-892}
}

• R. Kanbur, M. Keen
• Published 1991
• Economics
• The American Economic Review

Closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures. this paper uses a simple two-country model to address a range of policy concerns that consequently arise, focusing particularly on the role of national size. Differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency due to non-cooperative behavior, harming both countries. The smaller country would lose form harmonization to any tax rate between those of the non-cooperative equilibrium, but both countries… Expand

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