JackHammer: Efficient Rowhammer on Heterogeneous FPGA-CPU Platforms

@article{Weissman2020JackHammerER,
  title={JackHammer: Efficient Rowhammer on Heterogeneous FPGA-CPU Platforms},
  author={Zane Weissman and T. Tiemann and D. Moghimi and E. Custodio and T. Eisenbarth and B. Sunar},
  journal={IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst.},
  year={2020},
  volume={2020},
  pages={169-195}
}
After years of development, FPGAs are finally making an appearance on multi-tenant cloud servers. These heterogeneous FPGA-CPU architectures break common assumptions about isolation and security boundaries. Since the FPGA and CPU architectures share hardware resources, a new class of vulnerabilities requires us to reassess the security and dependability of these platforms. In this work, we analyze the memory and cache subsystem and study Rowhammer and cache attacks enabled on two proposed… Expand

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