• Corpus ID: 6482532

JEL classification : D 8 , K 12 Contracts , Holdup , and Legal Intervention

@inproceedings{Shavell2005JELC,
  title={JEL classification : D 8 , K 12 Contracts , Holdup , and Legal Intervention},
  author={Steven Shavell},
  year={2005}
}
This article develops the point that the problems associated with contractual holdup may justify legal intervention in theory, and the article relates this conclusion to legal intervention in practice. Contractual holdup is considered for both fresh contracts and for modifications of contracts. The law can in principle alleviate the incentive and risk-bearing problems due to holdup in two ways. One approach is for the law simply to void agreements made in certain circumstances, since that will… 
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