JCAT: a platform for the TAC market design competition

  title={JCAT: a platform for the TAC market design competition},
  author={Jinzhong Niu and Kai Cai and Simon Parsons and Enrico Gerding and Peter McBurney and Thierry Moyaux and Steve Phelps and David Shield},
Auctions, when well designed, result in desirable economic outcomes and have been widely used in solving real-world resour ce allocation problems, and in structuring stock or futures ex changes. The field of auction mechanism design has drawn much attentio n in recent years from economists, mathematicians, and compute r scientists. In traditional auction theory, auctions are viewe d as games of incomplete information and traditional analytic method s from game theory have been successfully… CONTINUE READING
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