• DOI:10.1073/pnas.1206569109
• Corpus ID: 11847647

Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent

@article{Press2012IteratedPD,
  title={Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent},
  author={William H. Press and Freeman J. Dyson},
  journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year={2012},
  volume={109},
  pages={10409 - 10413}
}

• W. Press, F. Dyson
• Published 21 May 2012
• Psychology
• Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

The two-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a model for both sentient and evolutionary behaviors, especially including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally assumed that there exists no simple ultimatum strategy whereby one player can enforce a unilateral claim to an unfair share of rewards. Here, we show that such strategies unexpectedly do exist. In particular, a player X who is witting of these strategies can (i) deterministically set her opponent Y’s score, independently of his strategy or response, or (ii) enforce an extortionate linear relation between her and his scores. Against such a player, an evolutionary player’s best response is to accede to the extortion. Only a player with a theory of mind about his opponent can do better, in which case Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is an Ultimatum Game.