Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent

  title={Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent},
  author={William H. Press and Freeman J. Dyson},
  journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  pages={10409 - 10413}
  • W. Press, F. Dyson
  • Published 21 May 2012
  • Psychology
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
The two-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a model for both sentient and evolutionary behaviors, especially including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally assumed that there exists no simple ultimatum strategy whereby one player can enforce a unilateral claim to an unfair share of rewards. Here, we show that such strategies unexpectedly do exist. In particular, a player X who is witting of these strategies can (i) deterministically set her opponent Y’s score, independently of… 

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