It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace

  title={It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace},
  author={Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
In this paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increases… 

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