It Just Doesn’t Feel Right: OCD and the ‘Scaling Up’ Problem

  title={It Just Doesn’t Feel Right: OCD and the ‘Scaling Up’ Problem},
  author={Adrian Downey},
  journal={Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences},
  • Adrian Downey
  • Published 1 September 2020
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences
The ‘scaling up’ objection says non-representational ecological-enactive accounts will be unable to explain ‘representation hungry’ cognition. Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) presents a paradigmatic instance of this objection, marked as it is by ‘representation hungry’ obsessive thoughts and compulsive behavior organized around them. In this paper I provide an ecological-enactive account of OCD, thereby demonstrating non-representational frameworks can ‘scale up’ to explain ‘representation… 


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