Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions

  title={Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions},
  author={Tuomas Sandholm},
  journal={International Journal of Electronic Commerce},
  pages={107 - 129}
  • T. Sandholm
  • Published 1 March 2000
  • Economics
  • International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Abstract: The Vickrey auction has been widely advocated for multiagent systems. This protocol has several limitations (lower revenue than with alternative protocols, lying in non-private-value auctions, bidder collusion, lying auctioneers, undesirable revelations of sensitive information), and they are reviewed so as to guide practitioners in deciding when to use it. The special characteristics of Internet auctions are also discussed (third-party auction servers, cryptography, how proxy agents… 
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  • K. Larson, T. Sandholm
  • Economics
    Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004.
  • 2004
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