Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it?

@article{Fine2006IsTE,
  title={Is the emotional dog wagging its rational tail, or chasing it?},
  author={Cordelia Fine},
  journal={Philosophical Explorations},
  year={2006},
  volume={9},
  pages={83 - 98}
}
  • C. Fine
  • Published 1 March 2006
  • Psychology
  • Philosophical Explorations
According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic ‘moral intuitions’. Private moral reasoning—when it occurs—is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt… 

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