Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’?: A response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill

@article{Saari1987IsAV,
  title={Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’?: A response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill},
  author={Donald G. Saari and Jill Van Newenhizen},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={1987},
  volume={59},
  pages={133-147}
}
Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill (1988) contend that the indeterminacy of approval voting (AV), introduced in our paper (1988), is not a vice, but a surpassing virtue of AV. They do not compare the negative versus the positive features of AV, so their assertion remains a conjecture. Our response emphasizes the need to determine the costs of AV and to evaluate them against any merits. Moreover, by correcting and answering BFM's comments, the argument against AV becomes much stronger. This is because… 
Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting
Approval voting (AV) has been defended and criticized from many different viewpoints. In this paper, I will concentrate on two topics: preference intensities and strategic behavior. A voter is
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
TLDR
Ballot data from some of the societies that adopted AV are used to compare theoretical results with experience, including the nature of voting under AV and the kinds of candidates that are elected.
Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
Voters are sovereign to the degree that they can express their approval for any set of candidates. While voter sovereignty is maximized under approval voting (AV), AV can lead to a plethora of
A Strategic Problem in Approval Voting
Problems of multi-candidate races in U.S. presidential elections—exemplified by Ralph Nader’s spoiler effect in 2000—motivated the modern invention and advocacy of approval voting; but it has not
Susceptibility to manipulation
All positional voting procedures can be manipulated, so it is natural to question whether some of these systems are more susceptible to being manipulated than others. In this essay, this
Approval Voting, Borda Winners, and Condorcet Winners: Evidence From Seven Elections
We analyze 10 three-candidate elections (and mock elections) conducted under approval voting (AV) using a method developed by Falmagne and Regenwetter (1996) that allows us to construct a
Would the Borda Count Have Avoided the Civil War?
The election of 1860 was one of the most important and contentious elections in US history. It was also one of the most interesting. Four candidates from three different parties battled for the
The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting
  • J. Nagel
  • Economics
    The Journal of Politics
  • 2007
Problems of multicandidate races in U.S. presidential elections motivated the modern invention and advocacy of approval voting; but it has not previously been recognized that the first four
Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?
I address the two-century old question raised in the title and other social choice concerns while responding to Risse [11]; e.g., my paper, part of which is a written version of my 2004 Oberwolfach
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Saari and Van Newenhizen (1987) misinterpret their findings about the indeterminacy of voting systems: far from being a vice, indeterminacy is a virtue in allowing voters to be more responsive to,
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It is well known that a plurality election need not reflect the true sentiments of the electorate. Some of the proposed reform procedures, such as approval and cumulative voting, share the
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