Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?

  title={Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?},
  author={Roberta Romano},
  journal={Yale Law School},
  • R. Romano
  • Published 27 March 2005
  • Economics, Law
  • Yale Law School
This article provides an analysis of why regulatory competition in corporate law has operated, for the most part, successfully in the United States, and critiques the position of commentators who are skeptical of the significance and extent of state competition. The article begins by setting out the context in which regulatory competition has been most recently criticized, the U.S. Congress's response to corporate accounting scandals in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and by briefly noting how the… 

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