Is Rationality Normative?

  title={Is Rationality Normative?},
  author={John Broome},
  pages={161 - 178}
  • J. Broome
  • Published 1 November 2007
  • Philosophy
  • Disputatio
Abstract Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend what you believe is a necessary means to an end that you intend. Suppose rationality requires you to F. Does this fact constitute a reason for you to F? Does it even follow from this fact that you have a reason to F? I examine these questions and reach a sceptical conclusion about them. I can find no satisfactory argument to show that either has the answer ‘yes’. I… Expand
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  • J. Broome
  • Philosophy
  • Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
  • 2006
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