Is Experience Transparent?

  title={Is Experience Transparent?},
  author={Charles Siewert},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
1Consciousness, some say, is “transparent” to first-person acts of attention; experience is “diaphanous.” You might take this to suggest that when you try to focus attention on consciousness or experience itself, you find you cannot: attention “passes through” straight to the object you are conscious of – the object you experience. But the metaphor has been variously elaborated. Here are two recent invocations of transparency by philosophers who think it bears significantly on the nature of… 

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