Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist’s Dilemma

  title={Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist’s Dilemma},
  author={Francesco Berto},
In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named 'fallacy of verbalism' the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two (clusters of) mainstream paraconsistent logical theories - the non-adjunctive and relevant approaches -, and show that, if they are given a strongly paraconsistent or dialetheic reading, the charge of committing the Russellian Fallacy can be raised against them in a sophisticated way, by appealing to the… 
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