Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal

  title={Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal},
  author={Felipe De Brigard},
  journal={Mind \& Language},
  • F. Brigard
  • Published 1 June 2010
  • Philosophy
  • Mind & Language
Recent experimental research has revealed surprising patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is that it has been conducted exclusively on people from Western cultures. The present paper extends previous research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of… 

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