• Corpus ID: 244908541

Invitation in Crowdsourcing Contests

  title={Invitation in Crowdsourcing Contests},
  author={Qi Shi and Dong Hao},
In a crowdsourcing contest, a requester holding a task posts it to a crowd. People in the crowd then compete with each other to win the rewards. Although in real life, a crowd is usually networked and people influence each other via social ties, existing crowdsourcing contest theories do not aim to answer how interpersonal relationships influence peoples’ incentives and behaviors, and thereby affect the crowdsourcing performance. In this work, we novelly take peoples’ social ties as a key… 

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