Investor Activism and Takeovers

@article{Greenwood2009InvestorAA,
  title={Investor Activism and Takeovers},
  author={R. Greenwood and Michael Schor},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
  year={2009},
  volume={92},
  pages={362-375}
}
Recent work documents large positive abnormal returns when a hedge fund announces activist intentions regarding a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover. For a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for targets that are ultimately acquired, but not detectably different from zero for firms that… Expand
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