Investments as Signals of Outside Options

  title={Investments as Signals of Outside Options},
  author={Susanne Goldl{\"u}cke and Patrick W. Schmitz},
  journal={Corporate Finance: Valuation},
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information
  • P. Schmitz
  • Economics
    Journal of Public Economics
  • 2021
Public Goods and the Hold-Up Problem Under Asymmetric Information
Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives
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