Invasion of Cooperation in Scale-Free Networks: Accumulated versus Average Payoffs

  title={Invasion of Cooperation in Scale-Free Networks: Accumulated versus Average Payoffs},
  author={Genki Ichinose and Hiroki Sayama},
  journal={Artificial Life},
It is well known that cooperation cannot be an evolutionarily stable strategy for a non-iterative game in a well-mixed population. In contrast, structured populations favor cooperation, since cooperators can benefit each other by forming local clusters. Previous studies have shown that scale-free networks strongly promote cooperation. However, little is known about the invasion mechanism of cooperation in scale-free networks. To study microscopic and macroscopic behaviors of cooperators… 
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Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation
  • N. Masuda
  • Economics
    Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
  • 2007
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