Intuitive reasoning about probability: Theoretical and experimental analyses of the “problem of three prisoners”

@article{Shimojo1989IntuitiveRA,
  title={Intuitive reasoning about probability: Theoretical and experimental analyses of the “problem of three prisoners”},
  author={Shinsuke Shimojo and Shin'ichi Ichikawa},
  journal={Cognition},
  year={1989},
  volume={32},
  pages={1-24}
}
ERRONEOUS BELIEFS IN ESTIMATING POSTERIOR PROBABILITY
The characteristics of human intuitive reasoning in estimating posterior probability can often be clarified through counterintuitive problems. A modified version of the “problem of three prisoners”
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