Intuitive confidence: choosing between intuitive and nonintuitive alternatives.

  title={Intuitive confidence: choosing between intuitive and nonintuitive alternatives.},
  author={Joseph P. Simmons and Leif D. Nelson},
  journal={Journal of experimental psychology. General},
  volume={135 3},
People often choose intuitive rather than equally valid nonintuitive alternatives. The authors suggest that these intuitive biases arise because intuitions often spring to mind with subjective ease, and the subjective ease leads people to hold their intuitions with high confidence. An investigation of predictions against point spreads found that people predicted intuitive options (favorites) more often than equally valid (or even more valid) nonintuitive alternatives (underdogs). Critically… 

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