Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures

  title={Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures},
  author={Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky},
Introduction Any significant activity of forecasting involves a large component of judgment, intuition, and educated guesswork. Indeed, the opinions of experts are the source of many technological, political, and social forecasts. Opinions and intuitions play an important part even where the forecasts are obtained by a mathematical model or a simulation. Intuitive judgments enter in the choice of the variables that are considered in such models, the impact factors that are assigned to them, and… 

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