Introduction to a special issue in honor of Kenneth Arrow

  title={Introduction to a special issue in honor of Kenneth Arrow},
  author={E. M. Penn},
  journal={Public Choice},
  • E. M. Penn
  • Published 2019
  • Political Science
  • Public Choice
Arrovian Aggregation of Convex Preferences
This work provides characterizations of both the domains of preferences and the social welfare functions that allow for anonymous Arrovian aggregation, which can be readily applied in settings involving divisible resources such as probability, time, or money. Expand


A defense of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives
Since the publication of Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom has drawn criticism for being too strong a requirement of aExpand
Arrow, and unexpected consequences of his theorem
A new way to interpret Arrow’s impossibility theorem leads to valued insights that extend beyond voting and social choice to address other mysteries ranging from the social sciences to even the “darkExpand
Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote Interstate compact on the functioning ofExpand
Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem stretching to other fields
Abstract Arrow’s impossibility result not only had a profound influence on welfare economics, but was, as this paper shows, also widely discussed in philosophy of science and in the engineeringExpand
Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules
These reflections, written in honor of Kenneth Arrow, sketch out how one political scientist thinks about Arrow’s theorem and its implications for voting rules. The basic claim is that Arrow’sExpand
Remembering Kenneth Arrow: discount rates
This remembrance of Kenneth Arrow describes his contribution to the consideration of social discount rates applied to intertemporal flows of costs and benefits.
Social welfare with net utilities
We consider a society facing a binary choice, in an environment in which differences in utility are comparable across individuals. In such an environment, net utility is the difference between theExpand
Weak rationalizability and Arrovian impossibility theorems for responsive social choice
This paper provides representation theorems for choice functions satisfying weak rationality conditions: a choice function satisfies $$\alpha$$α if and only if it can be expressed as the union ofExpand
Why Arrow’s theorem matters for political theory even if preference cycles never occur
Riker (Liberalism against populism, Waveland, New York, 1982) famously argued that Arrow’s impossibility theorem undermined the logical foundations of “populism”, the view that in a democracy, lawsExpand
Social Choice and Legitimacy: The Possibilities of Impossibility
Part I. The Ubiquity of Aggregation: 1. Goals and trade-offs 2. The debates surrounding social choice 3. Social choice defended Part II. A Theory of Legitimate Choice: 4. Legitimacy and choice 5.Expand