Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)

  title={Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)},
  author={Noam Nisan},
  • N. Nisan
  • Published 1 September 2007
  • Economics
Abstract We give an introduction to the micro-economic field of Mechanism Design slightly biased toward a computer-scientist's point of view. Introduction Mechanism Design is a subfield of economic theory that is rather unique within economics in having an engineering perspective. It is interested in designing economic mechanisms, just like computer scientists are interested in designing algorithms, protocols, or systems. It is best to view the goals of the designed mechanisms in the very… Expand
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