Introduction: The Unilateral Freeing of Trade Versus Reciprocity

@inproceedings{Bhagwati2002IntroductionTU,
  title={Introduction: The Unilateral Freeing of Trade Versus Reciprocity},
  author={Jagdish N. Bhagwati},
  year={2002}
}
2 We came to the conclusion that the less we attempted to persuade foreigners to adopt our trade principles, the better; for we discovered so much suspicion of the motives of England, that it was lending an argument to the protectionists abroad to incite the popular feeling against free-traders, by enabling them to say, " See what these men are wanting to do; they are partisans of England and they are seeking to prostitute our industries at the feet of that perfidious nation… " To take away… Expand
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References

earlier regarding the large-country case
  • earlier regarding the large-country case