Intrinsic content , active memory and the extended mind

@inproceedings{Clark2004IntrinsicC,
  title={Intrinsic content , active memory and the extended mind},
  author={Andy Clark},
  year={2004}
}
Clark and Chalmers (1998) defend the view that the human mind need not be in the human head. To speak more carefully, they defend the view that the material vehicles 1 of cognition can be spread out across brain, body and certain aspects of the physical environment itself. Critics of this view (which has become known as the ‘extended mind hypothesis’, henceforth EM) have pointed to the supposedly intrinsic nature of the contents carried by inner biological vehicles. External, non-biological… CONTINUE READING
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