Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study

  title={Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study},
  author={Lu{\'i}s Cabral and Erkut Y. Ozbay and Andrew Schotter},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
We experimentally test a repeated veto game: in each of an in…nite number of periods, Nature generates a pair of payo¤s, one for each player. Although the sum of the players’payo¤s is positive, with positive probability one of the players receives a negative payo¤. Players simultaneously decide whether to approve such a proposal. If either of the players vetoes the proposal, both players get zero; otherwise, they receive the value generated by Nature. In this context, we devise an experiment to… CONTINUE READING
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