Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma

@article{Gibbard2014IntransitiveSI,
  title={Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma},
  author={A. Gibbard},
  journal={Review of Economic Design},
  year={2014},
  volume={18},
  pages={3-10}
}
  • A. Gibbard
  • Published 2014
  • Economics
  • Review of Economic Design
This paper deals with a proposal by Frederic Schick for resolving Arrow’s dilemma of social choice. Schick challenges Arrow’s assumption that rational social indifference is transitive. It turns out, however, that even if we drop this assumption, we still face a dilemma as embarrassing as Arrow’s. Any constitution which satisfies the remaining conditions is a liberum veto oligarchy. This means a unique set of individuals carries any issue on which it is unanimous, and engenders social… Expand
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