Intertemporal Price Discrimination

@article{Stokey1979IntertemporalPD,
  title={Intertemporal Price Discrimination},
  author={Nancy L. Stokey},
  journal={Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  year={1979},
  volume={93},
  pages={355-371}
}
  • Nancy L. Stokey
  • Published 1 August 1979
  • Economics, Medicine
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics
I. Introduction, 355.—II. No production costs: "pure" discrimination, 357.—III. Positive production costs, 363.—IV. Conclusion, 367. 
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