Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States
@article{Goldstein2000IntersubjectivePB,
title={Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States},
author={Irwin L. Goldstein},
journal={Philosophy},
year={2000},
volume={75},
pages={89 - 104}
}How do people learn names for kinds of sensations? Wittgenstein identifies two possibilities. 1. Direct acquaintance: A person feels a sensation, notes its intrinsic character, and sets about to use the word thereafter for this sensation. 2. Outward signs: A person pins his use of the word to the sensation's outward signs. Wittgenstein rejects 1 and endorses 2. He thinks a sensation name can be learned only if people pin their use of the word to outward signs. I identify a third procedure and…
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