Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States

@article{Goldstein2000IntersubjectivePB,
  title={Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States},
  author={Irwin L. Goldstein},
  journal={Philosophy},
  year={2000},
  volume={75},
  pages={89 - 104}
}
  • I. Goldstein
  • Published 1 January 2000
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • Philosophy
How do people learn names for kinds of sensations? Wittgenstein identifies two possibilities. 1. Direct acquaintance: A person feels a sensation, notes its intrinsic character, and sets about to use the word thereafter for this sensation. 2. Outward signs: A person pins his use of the word to the sensation's outward signs. Wittgenstein rejects 1 and endorses 2. He thinks a sensation name can be learned only if people pin their use of the word to outward signs. I identify a third procedure and… 
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References

85 and Foster's The Case for Idealism
  • These quotes are from 'Berkeley on the Physical World
  • 1982