Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples
@article{Cao2002InternetPW, title={Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples}, author={Xi-Ren Cao and Hong-Xia Shen and Rodolfo A. Milito and Patricia E. Wirth}, journal={IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.}, year={2002}, volume={10}, pages={208-216} }
The basic concepts of three branches of game theory, leader-follower, cooperative, and two-person nonzero sum games, are reviewed and applied to the study of the Internet pricing issue. In particular, we emphasize that the cooperative game (also called the bargaining problem) provides an overall picture for the issue. With a simple model for Internet quality of service (QoS), we demonstrate that the leader-follower game may lead to a solution that is not Pareto optimal and in some cases may be… CONTINUE READING
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