• Corpus ID: 131757133

International Phenomenological Society Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction

@inproceedings{Kim2008InternationalPS,
  title={International Phenomenological Society Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction},
  author={Jaegwon Kim},
  year={2008}
}
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