Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments : the Optimality of Partial Disclosure

  title={Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments : the Optimality of Partial Disclosure},
  author={Maria Goltsman},
Workers competing in a tournament for a given prize, say a promotion, often perform sequentially in multiple stages. When the …rm is privately informed about the workers’performance, it can sharpen incentives by strategically disclosing the intermediate results. But the policies that enhance …nal-stage e¤ort may dampen incentives at the intermediate stage. In our model, the optimal disclosure policy has a simple form: disclose only if all workers perform poorly. This result o¤ers a novel justi… CONTINUE READING
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