Intergenerational risk shifting through social security and bailout politics


This paper adopts a stochastic overlapping generations framework to analyze the allocation of aggregate financial risks under different social security systems and a majority voting rule. We study whether there will be switches between pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and fully funded (FF) systems in such an economy. We show that in case of a negative aggregate shock, lowincome young individuals will form a political coalition with the elderly to implement a PAYG system. PAYG scheme is shown to persist even after a good aggregate shock if the system is redistributive enough. r 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: H55; D72; D91; E62

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@inproceedings{Bossi2001IntergenerationalRS, title={Intergenerational risk shifting through social security and bailout politics}, author={Luca Bossi}, year={2001} }