Interdependent Security With Strategic Agents and Cascades of Infection

@article{La2016InterdependentSW,
  title={Interdependent Security With Strategic Agents and Cascades of Infection},
  author={Richard J. La},
  journal={IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking},
  year={2016},
  volume={24},
  pages={1378-1391}
}
  • R. La
  • Published 25 February 2015
  • Economics
  • IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
We investigate cascades in networks consisting of strategic agents with interdependent security. We assume that the strategic agents have choices between (i) investing in protecting themselves, (ii) purchasing insurance to transfer (some) risks, and (iii) taking no actions. Using a population game model, we study how various system parameters, such as node degrees, infection propagation rate, and the probability with which infected nodes transmit infection to neighbors, affect nodes' choices at… 

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