Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

  title={Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems},
  author={Karen Elfner Cox and Leonard Schoppa},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={1027 - 1053}
The past decade has witnessed a surprising growth in the popularity of mixed-member electoral systems. Under these systems, voters choose representatives simultaneously under both proportional representation (PR) and single-member district plurality (SMDP) rules. It is widely accepted that SMDP rules tend to winnow competition down toward two large parties, and evidence from mixed systems suggests that this Duvergerian “gravity” reduces the number of parties surviving SMDP competition under… 

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