Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation

  title={Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation},
  author={Joshua Knobe},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={309 - 324}
  • J. Knobe
  • Published 1 June 2003
  • Psychology
  • Philosophical Psychology
Four experiments examined people's folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not evaluative considerations--considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame--played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people's judgments as to whether or not that behavior should be considered "intentional." After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes… 
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