Intentional action: Conscious experience and neural prediction

@article{Haggard2003IntentionalAC,
  title={Intentional action: Conscious experience and neural prediction},
  author={Patrick Haggard and Sam Clark},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},
  year={2003},
  volume={12},
  pages={695-707}
}
  • P. Haggard, Sam Clark
  • Published 1 December 2003
  • Psychology, Biology, Philosophy
  • Consciousness and Cognition
View on Elsevier
journalpsyche.org
266 Citations
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128
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Results Citations
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