Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation

@article{Dreyfus2002IntelligenceWR,
  title={Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation},
  author={H. Dreyfus},
  journal={Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  year={2002},
  volume={1},
  pages={367-383}
}
  • H. Dreyfus
  • Published 2002
  • Psychology
  • Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are… Expand
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