Intelligence and military doctrine: paradox or oxymoron?

@article{Davies2019IntelligenceAM,
  title={Intelligence and military doctrine: paradox or oxymoron?},
  author={Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson},
  journal={Defence Studies},
  year={2019},
  volume={19},
  pages={19 - 36}
}
ABSTRACT This article examines the evolution of the current British military joint intelligence doctrine. We argue that military intelligence doctrine is dogged by an intrinsic tension between the ethos and expectations of military doctrine and those of the professional practice of intelligence. We further argue not only that prior iterations of UK joint intelligence doctrine failed to effectively deal with this intelligence doctrine dilemma, but also that measures in the current doctrine to… Expand
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