Institutional Investor Power and Heterogeneity Implications for Agency and Stakeholder Theories

@inproceedings{Ryan2003InstitutionalIP,
  title={Institutional Investor Power and Heterogeneity Implications for Agency and Stakeholder Theories},
  author={Lori Verstegen Ryan and Marguerite Schneider},
  year={2003}
}
This article examines the implications of the escalation in institutional inves power and heterogeneity for two dominant theories of corporate governanceagency theory and stakeholder theory. From this analysis, a new view of the agency relationship between institutional investors and their portfolio firms emerges, which recognizes the institutions’ market power, complex role as financial intermediaries, and possible involvement in simultaneous and opposing agency contracts. We also conclude… CONTINUE READING

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