Corpus ID: 167016157

Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme

@article{Geczy2015InstitutionalIW,
  title={Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme},
  author={Christopher C. Geczy and Jessica S. Jeffers and David K. Musto and Anne M. Tucker},
  journal={Fiduciary Law eJournal},
  year={2015}
}
Institutional investors, with trillions in assets under management, hold increasingly important stakes in public companies and fund individual retirement for many Americans, making institutional investors’ behaviors and preferences paramount determinants of capital allocations and the economy. In this paper, we examine high fiduciary duty institutions' (HFDIs') response to decreased profit maximization pressure as measured by the effect of constituency statutes on HFDI investment. We ask this… Expand
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References

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Neutral Court opinions that cited, referenced by name, or included dicta regarding constituency statutes were coded as Neutral. Mere citations to constituency statutes were coded as subcategory A
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BUS. CORP. LAW § 1701–1709 (McKinney) Effective February 10, 2012 \\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\5-1\HLB103.txt unknown Seq
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Benefit Corporation Act W. VA
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Benefit Corporation Act S.C. CODE ANN
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CODE ANN
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PA Positive 1A Prudential Mut. Holding Co, CIV.A. 06-4432
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Creative OH Positive 1B Engineered Polymer Products
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