Institution Formation and Cooperation with Heterogeneous Agents

@article{Kube2015InstitutionFA,
  title={Institution Formation and Cooperation with Heterogeneous Agents},
  author={Sebastian Kube and Sebastian Schaube and Hannah schildberg-H{\"o}risch and Elina Khachatryan},
  journal={ERN: Cooperative Games (Topic)},
  year={2015}
}
Driven by an ever-growing number of studies that explore the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms meant to mitigate cooperation problems, recent years have seen an increasing interest in the endogenous implementation of these institutions. In this paper, we test within a unified framework how the process of institution formation is affected by three key aspects of natural environments: i) heterogeneity among players in the benefits of cooperation, ii) (a)symmetry in players' institutional… Expand
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