Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation

@inproceedings{Forst2009InsiderEA,
  title={Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation},
  author={Arno Forst},
  year={2009}
}
Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation By Arno Forst, Ph.D. A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University. Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009 Chair: Dr. Benson Wier Professor, Department of Accounting This study investigates the effects of insider entrenchment on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in firms conducting an… Expand
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