Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain

@article{Wolinsky2003InformationTW,
  title={Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain},
  author={Asher Wolinsky},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2003},
  volume={42},
  pages={319-326}
}
In deciding on the magnitude of a certain action (say, investment), a decision maker re the report of an informed and interested expert who can suppress favorable information. Th departure from the related literature is that the decision maker is uncertain as to whether the is of a type that wants to minimize the magnitude of the action or to maximize it. The u equilibrium outcome is fully characterized by a threshold level of favorable information. I information is more favorable than that… CONTINUE READING
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