Information feedback in a dynamic tournament

  title={Information feedback in a dynamic tournament},
  author={Masaki Aoyagi},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents’ effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately observed by the principal. The principal controls the agents’ effort incentive through the use of a feedback policy, which transforms his private information into a public announcement. The optimal feedback policy is one that maximizes the agents’ expected effort. The paper identifies when the principal should use the… CONTINUE READING
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