• Corpus ID: 18693099

Information Selection in Noisy Environments with Large Action Spaces

@article{Tsividis2014InformationSI,
  title={Information Selection in Noisy Environments with Large Action Spaces},
  author={Pedro Tsividis and Samuel J. Gershman and Joshua B. Tenenbaum and Laura E. Schulz},
  journal={Cognitive Science},
  year={2014},
  volume={36}
}
Information Selection in Noisy Environments with Large Action Spaces Pedro Tsividis (tsividis@mit.edu), Samuel J. Gershman (sjgershm@mit.edu), Joshua B. Tenenbaum (jbt@mit.edu), Laura Schulz (lshulz@mit.edu) Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, 77 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02139 USA Abstract A critical aspect of human cognition is the ability to effec- tively query the environment for information. The ‘real’ world is large and noisy, and… 

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