Information Dynamics and Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change ∗

@inproceedings{Angeletos2004InformationDA,
  title={Information Dynamics and Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change ∗},
  author={George-Marios Angeletos and Christian Hellwig and Alessandro Pavan},
  year={2004}
}
Global games of regime change — that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a “status quo” is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it — have been used to study crises phenomena such bank runs, currency attacks, debt crises, and political change. We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to accumulate information over time and take actions in many periods. It is shown that dynamics may lead to multiple equilibria… CONTINUE READING

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